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Dear Bruce,
Thank you for your invitation to participate in the DNA
symposium. As you know DNA has never been a prime
research focus of mine, and I have been so preoccupied
with my own work on ITPT (intertemporal personal
transportation) that I thought I must decline. Happily,
however, the two projects came together, for I recently
had an amazing breakthrough during which by coincidence I stumbled across a book entitled A Century of
DNA Testing and holocopied (a fancy form of Xeroxing) the following few pages for you.
Even by 1996, before the second NRC Report, which
fostered the switch to Bayesian methods, appeared and
several years before the general abandonment of RFLP
procedures, the statistical issues that had so roiled the
early days of DNA testing had largely been resolved.
This occurred not because the statistical and genetic disputes we describe above had all been resolved,
but rather because the need to confirm identifications
from burgeoning data bases stimulated several different innovations that increased the informativeness of
the RFLP approach to DNA testing, thus reducing the
chances of coincidental matches to minuscule proportions even when the suspect population included relatives or had the same narrow ethnic heritage. In one
Minnesota case, for example, the state crime lab simply
tested alleles at nine loci. But Minnesota at the time was
laboring under a short-sighted (and soon overturned)
court ruling which precluded attaching statistical probabilities to DNA matches, and thus, without resorting
to statistics, the lab's scientists had to be able to testify
that an identification was virtually certain.
Nevertheless, problems stemming from what Professor Junipurr, some fifty years ago, in his study

of forensic laboratories called the 'infallibility complex' continued to appear. Some of the most important of these problems and ways that were suggested
at the time for meeting them are captured in the following extracts from the original edition (Jack Point,
ed., 1996) of the still essential handbook, The Honest
Scientist's Guide to DNA Evidence. We can in this history do no better than reproduce the relevant portions,
leaving the original spelling and grammar, including
archaic gendered pronouns, untouched. The somewhat preachy nature of the original handbook was,
we believe, influenced by the religious fundamentalism resurgent at that period. Also, though it may not
be evident to readers today, many of the Handbook's
suggestions were regarded at the time as quite Utopian.

Section 7.1: (Subjectivity)
The honest scientist recognizes that she herself is a
test instrument, and a fallible one at that. Subjectivity inescapably enters into any human endeavor, and
should not be denied. DNA testing is rife with subjective elements, no place more so than at the crucial
stage of deciding whether a match exists (1). On the one
hand, non-matching extraneous bands may sometimes
be properly disregarded and patterns that do not quite
meet objective matching criteria may be appropriately
regarded as incriminatory matches. On the other hand,
band patterns that do meet objective matching criteria
may be treated as exonerative depending on how they
deviate from perfect matches. The DNA expert should
not hide behind the cloak of science to deny the role
of human judgement. White coats should not be worn
into the courtroom either literally or figuratively.
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At the same time, the honest scientist tries to be as
objective as possible in her judgements. She realizes
that this is inconsistent with a strong a priori belief that
the donor of a suspect sample is guilty. Thus she avoids
any information suggesting the involvement or uninvolvement of the accused until after she has prepared
her report and, in the ideal case, until after she has testified. Laboratories should cooperate to make this easy.
Crime-related information should be stripped from all
information sent to the analyst unless it is essential to
the test and its interpretation (e.g. information that severn people are suspected of participating in a rape or
that the suspected rapist is the victim's brother).
Scrupulous laboratories should also realize that
being continually identified with a side may also bias
judgements. Thus, they should seek out business from
defense attorneys who seek to exonerate clients and
encourage their scientists to take the rare opportunities
that come along to testify on behalf of defendants.
An additional and highly recommended way of
coping with subjectivity is to transform DNA tests from
true-false into multiple-choice tests by routinely providing scientists with three test samples. One or two
of these, varying on some random schedule, should be
the suspect's and the other(s) should come from one or
two non-suspects. This marginally increases the cost
of DNA tests, but we are dealing with decisions that
can take human lives. Moreover, multiple testing carries the added benefit of providing laboratory-specific
proficiency information.

Section 9.3: (Proficiency Testing--continued)
The honest scientist works for the Virtuous laboratory.
The Virtuous laboratory maintains a rigorous system of
proficiency testing, both to identify and correct sources
of error and as an incentive for continual high quality
staff work. Four types of samples may be analyzed as
part of a proficiency testing program: known samples,
unknown samples of pure quality, unknown samples of
case quality, and apparent case samples. While these
different types of samples all have a role to play in measuring and maintaining laboratory proficiency, only the
last, test samples regarded by both the laboratory and
analyst as true casework samples, provides a true picture of the quality of laboratory procedures, for only
apparent case samples are certain to be treated by laboratories as if they were casework samples. Conversely,

if a laboratory knows that any apparent case sample it
analyzes may be a test, the incentive is to treat each
sample submitted for analysis as if it were a test sample, and the quality of all the laboratory's work should
increase.
It is, even today, difficult to generate convincing
casework test samples, for such samples must appear
to have come from specific police departments or prosecutors' offices, and any communications with the
police or prosecutor's office during the course of analysis must be consistent with the otherwise apparent genuineness of the sample. For this reason, laboratories,
police and prosecutors should agree to join the proposed APTLAB (Accredited Proficiency Tested Laboratory Analysis Bureau) organization. As proposed
APTLAB would serve as an intermediary between parties seeking DNA tests and laboratories that do them.
APTLAB would receive all DNA test samples from
police departments or other agencies and after removing unnecessary case-related information that might
accompany samples (see Section 7.1) would forward
the material to the laboratory that the agency chose to
conduct the test. Approximately one out of every eight
samples forwarded to a laboratory, on some random
schedule, would be a casework test sample. Although
the problem of false positive matches has been the target of most concern, APTLAB, according to the proposal, would forward as many matching test samples
as non-matching ones. Missing matches also reveals
weaknesses or biases in laboratory procedures, and the
error of mistakenly freeing an actual rapist or murderer
may be as socially harmful as mistakenly convicting
an innocent person. Only after test results were communicated to APTLAB would the testing laboratory
receive the name of the submitting agency. Thereafter
all communications would be between the laboratory
and the agency. Statistics on error rates, aggregated
across laboratories using similar procedures and also
by laboratories, would be made freely available.
At the moment it does not appear that APTLAB
will get off the ground, for the suggestion has met with
fierce resistance from forensic scientists and laboratory
directors. Three arguments are made against it. Least
is made of the first argument, but we suspect it is the
strongest of the stated motivations behind the heated
objections. This is that APTLAB will interfere with
the relations that many laboratories and forensic scientists have with the agencies and individuals that submit
samples to them. While this is true, the honest scientist
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should regard this as a virtue of the APTLAB proposal. Relations between laboratories, scientists and
police agencies today may include conversation about
the heinousness of the crime, which can cause a scientist to overly-identify with the police function, and
other evidence that incriminates the accused. Ordinarily this information is at best irrelevant to the scientific
validity of the test, and it can bias judgements and so
detract from it.
A second objection one often hears is that interposing an agency between the law enforcement body and
the testing laboratory simply adds a source of error.
This objection cannot be dismissed out of hand, but
since all test samples will be sent by courier under
seal to APTLAB and the seal will not be broken in
the transmission process, the possibility of introducing
additional error will be minimal.
The third objection concerns costs. This objection
is substantial, for running a new agency, even a genuine
non-profit agency costs money as does the proposed
121% increase in the number of DNA tests conducted.
These costs will, of course, be reflected in the price of
DNA tests and may decrease somewhat the propensity
of policy agencies to order DNA tests. However, the
cases where testing will be forgone will be most likely
those in which evidence of guilt apart from DNA is
overwhelming and DNA evidence is window dressing
not needed for a conviction. The cost issue also appears
different when one thinks in terms of total social costs.
It can cost between $20,000 and $50,000 to keep a
rapist in prison for a year and many times that to keep
a person on death row and eventually execute him.
This is totally apart from the costs to the wrongfully
convicted man. Conversely, mistaken acquittals can
lead to the rape or murder of future victims. Thus,
if the APTLAB procedures reduce errors as expected,
they will be cost justified. If after some experience with
APTLAB, its procedures do not appear cost justified,
the consortium can be terminated, and we can have
some confidence that there is no problem here.
There are also objections to APTLAB that have not
figured in the debate because no one dares make them
publicly. The first is the fear which some scientists privately voice, that uncomfortably high laboratory error
rates will be revealed, and the second is that APTLAB will displace several other organizations that in
a less rigorous but nonetheless serious fashion have
begun to develop proficiency testing programs. Per-

haps for these reasons more than the three that have
been articulated, objections to the APTLAB proposal
have been so fierce in the forensic science community
that absent legal mandate the best that can be hoped for
in the way of proficiency testing may be procedures,
like those that have been implemented in a number
of conscientious laboratories, consistent with the recommendations for proficiency testing in the first NRC
report. If so, it may be that the honest scientist will find
that there is no place that quite meets her standards.

Section 13.2: (Statistics and Error--continued)
The honest scientist recognizes that no matter what the
odds that a random man's DNA would match evidence
DNA, the probative value of a reported match between
the defendant's DNA and evidence DNA is always
affected by the likelihood that a match will be mistakenly reported (2). This probability is greater than the
likelihood that a test error might somehow mistakenly
yield a match, for it includes the chance that either
inadvertently or intentionally a second sample of evidence DNA has been substituted for or contaminated
the DNA of the defendant in a way that will not be
obvious in the testing (3). In testifying, the honest scientist should never attach more probative weight to the
evidence that this probability, which we will call the
false positive rate, reflects. In particular, the extremely
low probabilities often associated with random matches are likely to mislead the trier of fact and should not
be mentioned or, if mentioned, should be placed very
carefully in context so that they are clearly subordinate
to the false positive rate.
Such careful, limited testimony poses, however, a
difficulty. Unscrupulous defense attorneys may seek to
interpret false positive statistics so as to induce the jury
to make what Thompson and Schumann (4) have called
the 'defense attorney's fallacy.' The defense attorney's
fallacy falsely presupposes that there is no reason to
think the defendant is guilty apart from the identification evidence. Without stating this presupposition,
defense attorneys argue that statistical identification
evidence simply locates the defendant as one member
of a large group who might have committed the crime,
and so does little to finger the suspect.
In the example that follows, drawn from the transcript of the case called State v. Evett, the DNA
expert is careful not to overweight the probability of
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a reported DNA match. The cross-examiner then tries
to take advantage of this honest scientist by attempting
to induce the defense attorney's fallacy. On redirect
examination, this effort to mislead the jury is successfully countered. In a portion of the transcript we omit,
the scientist testified that a false positive rate of one
in a hundred, which she later uses, is a conservative
estimate. She also explains that while ordinarily the
police agencies she works with divide evidence DNA
and send it to several laboratories for independent testing (thus justifying a far lower false positive estimate),
division was impossible in this case because of the
limited amount of available evidence DNA. To conserve space we have also eliminated other aspects of
the direct, cross and redirect examinations that do not
bear on the issue discussed in this section.

DNA did not match the DNA extracted from the
semen. But if we did not make a mistake, then
there is only about one chance in fifty million that
some random person, which is to say some white
person not related to the defendant, could have left
the evidence DNA. Ultimately, however, the former figure is more important than the latter, so I
will summarize my testimony by saying that the
defendant's DNA appeared to match the evidence
DNA but there is about one chance in 100 that this
conclusion is mistaken. If the defendant's DNA
did match, it is very unlikely he is the victim of
coincidence.
P: Thank you, no further questions.

Cross examination
Direct examination

Prosecutor [P]:
When you conducted the analysis you described,
what exactly were your findings?

Scientist [S]:
I found that, within the limits I have already
mentioned, each of the seven alleles identified
in the DNA extracted from the defendant's blood
matched an allele found in the DNA extracted from
the semen found in the victim's vagina.
P: Did you find any alleles that did not match?
S: No, every allele we identified in the DNA extracted
from the defendant's blood corresponded in length
to an allele extracted from the semen.

P: Can you give the jury some idea of how unusual it
is to find the seven allele match you have reported?
S: If DNA tests were perfect, the chance that one
would find DNA matching that in the evidence
sample by testing one Caucasian man drawn randomly from the country's population is about one in
fifty million. However, as with all human endeavors DNA tests are not perfect. To the best we can
estimate, in about one test of every hundred we run
a DNA match is erroneously reported due to some
mix up or mistake in the field or in the laboratory.
So the best way of thinking about this evidence is
that there is about one chance in 100 that somewhere a mistake was made, and the defendant's

Defense Counsel [DC]:
Now Dr., you said that about one time in 100 when
you test for DNA you report a match as you did in
this case, but that match turns out to be false--isn't
that so?
S: Well, not exactly. The one in a hundred figure is a
conservatively estimated error rate based on what
are known as 'double blind' proficiency tests.
DC: But one in a hundred is your best estimate of the
false positive rate, isn't that so?
S: Best conservative estimate.
DC: Now there are about two million Caucasian males
living within 40 miles of where the crime occurred,
isn't that so?
S: If you say so; I don't live here.
DC: Well you can take my word on it. Now if any of
these men had been chosen at random and tested
there is about a one in a hundred chance that you
would be here telling me there was a match, isn't
that so?
S: Yes, assuming they had been suspected as the
defendant was.
DC: Dr. please just answer 'yes' or 'no.' Now it follows doesn't it that if all two million Caucasian
men had been tested, there would be about 20,000
positive tests reported?
S: Well, it's more complicated that that.
DC: Dr. 1/100 times two million is 20,000 is it not?
S: Yes.
DC: So basically what your test establishes is that there
is about one chance in 20,000 that my client is the
culprit.
S: No, that's ...
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DC: Dr. I didn't make any mathematical mistakes, did
I?
S: No.
DC: Thank you, no further questions.

Judge [J]
Were you going to interpret the evidence in this
case Dr. or just list what has been introduced?
S: I was just going to list it, Your Honor.

Redirect examination
P: Dr. do you feel that the defense counsel was accurately stating the import of the match you reported,
when she suggested that it meant that there was
one chance in 20,000 that the defendant was the
culprit?
S: No, I don't.
P: Can you explain why?
S: Yes, the defense counsel was trying to induce the
jury to buy into what is known in the literature as
the defense attorney's fallacy. It misleads because
it assumes that there is no other evidence in the
case.
P: Can you say more?
S: Yes, the defense counsel's calculations would not
be misleading had the defendant's name simply
been drawn from the phone book and had he then
been required to undergo a DNA test. If the police
drew 100 such names from the phone book and processed each individual as they would if he were the
prime suspect, handling his DNA and the evidence
DNA as they would that of a suspect, proficiency test results suggest that even if all the people
tested were innocent, there is a good chance that
we would mistakenly conclude in the case of one
person that there was a DNA match. If we tested
more people at random the chance of finding additional false positive results would increase, with
the expectation being that one such result would
occur in every hundred people tested, provided the
DNA and tests were handled exactly as they are
when actual suspects are tested.
But this defendant's name was not drawn at random from a phone book. Defense counsel's fundamental error is to ignore this fact; the defendant was
not selected for the DNA test at random. Instead
there was a reason the defendant's DNA was tested. As I understand the state's evidence in this case
DC: Objection.Your Honor, the witness's understanding of the evidence is irrelevant and interferes with
the province of the jury.

J: In that case you may proceed. Please do not give
your opinion of the evidence or mention any evidence the state has not introduced, for if you do I
shall have to sustain defense counsel's objection.
S: As I was saying the defendant was not just a random
person selected for testing. In this case the defendant was picked up because the last three digits on
his license plate matched the information provided by a woman who witnessed the abduction, the
victim testified that though the defendant had worn
a ski mask, she recognized his eyes and his voice,
when he was arrested the defendant had scratches on his face, which he refused to explain to the
police, and a hair was found in the defendant's car
consistent with hair that might have come from the
victim. In these circumstances, even with a false
positive rate of one in one hundred, the evidence of
a DNA match I presented is powerful confirmatory
evidence. Had the defendant been innocent despite
the other evidence against him 99 times out of 100
the DNA test would have demonstrated his innocence. If his alibi were true, the DNA test would
fail to confirm it only one time in a hundred.
Another way to think about this is to think about
the number of innocent Caucasian males, among
the two million who live in the area, who might by
coincidence be associated with as much incriminatory evidence as the defendant in this case. How
many others, for example, would share the same
three license plate digits, have unexplained scratches, sound like the defendant and have hair that
might have come from the victim in their car or
have an equivalent amount of other incriminatory
evidence pointing to them? What is this number?
One other? Five others? Ten others? While it is
for the jury to say and not I, my hunch is that the
number is so small that a test with a false positive
rate of one in one hundred would be very unlikely
to mistakenly identify anyone.
P: Thank you, Dr., no further questions.
Considering when it was written, in some respects
The Honest Scientist's Guide to DNA Evidence was
indeed Utopian, but as we document in the pages that
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follow, in other respects the Guide sparked debates that
led to needed reforms.

Well Bruce, that's it; at least that's all I could
copy and bring back with me given existing mass
constraints and the danger of temporal disruption. Of
course, before I submit this to your volume, I must
rewrite this material so it looks like these are my own
ideas. And please keep what I have told you regarding the true source of my comments confidential until
the equations for intertemporal transportation appear
in Nature, and I have taken the first steps towards
patenting my machine.
Sincerely,
Richard Lempert

(1)Thompson & Ford, The Meaning of a Match:
Sources of Ambiguity in the Interpretation of DNA
Prints. In Forensic DNA Tech. Ch. 7 (M. Farley &
J. Harrington, eds. 1991).
(2)Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as
Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to
the Reverend Bayes, 13 Cardozo Law Review 303
(1991).
(3) Establishing the likelihood of false positive errors
and their implications for the probative value of
DNA matches is no simple matter even putting
aside the number of proficiency tests that should
be conducted to achieve reliable error rate estimates. For example, the first external proficiency tests reported in the literature were conducted
by the California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors which sent 50 mock forensic samples to several of the laboratories that pioneered
in the forensic analysis of DNA identification evidence. In one set of tests, for example, a laboratory made a false positive error which a number

of early commentators, particularly in law reviews,
took as indicating that the best empirically grounded false positive error rate estimate was 2%. However, the laboratory was charged with comparing
each sample with every other, which suggests that
1225 comparisons were made, leaving the impression of a far higher accuracy rate, a point also made
in the literature. Neither portrait is correct. First,
the laboratory in question was able to compare only
45 samples, and the presence of matching samples,
including some that were matched by three other
samples, further limited the number of false positives that could occur. Moreover, the likely source
of the false positive was the inadvertent transfer
of DNA in a sample in one test tube to an adjacent DNA containing test tube. This type of error
could not affect most comparisons in the proficiency test because the test tubes were not all adjacent
to each other. In actual forensic testing, however, suspect and evidence samples might routinely
occupy adjacent test tubes in the test preparation
process, suggesting that the 2% error rate estimate
could be valid after all. However, the laboratory
involved quite sensibly changed its procedures following the proficiency test results (and it claimed
it had ordinarily done so in forensic work before
the test) so little can be made of this figure as
an estimate of the laboratory's future false positive rate. The story of this test and the error rate
estimates it generated emphasizes the importance
of double blind proficiency tests in which laboratories cannot distinguish proficiency test samples
from ordinary forensic samples. For a discussion
of further complications regarding the implications
of error probabilities, see Thompson's discussion
in this volume.
(4) Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials, 11 Law & Human
Behavior 167 (1987).

Editor's comments
The author's 'piece of whimsy' (his phrase) adds a light touch to this volume, even though it contains a serious discussion of the issue of false
positives.

